Tag: hadith

Independence of Thought is Islamic

Independence of thought recognized

The Holy Quran expressly recognizes independence of opinion for one and all, and requires that absolute obedience be given only to God and God’s Messenger:

“O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you; then if you quarrel about anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger…” (4:59)

This verse speaks of obedience to those in authority (ulu-l-amr), along with the obedience to the Messenger, and then mentions disputes which, it says, must be settled by referring them to God and the Messenger. The omission of ‘those in authority’ from the latter portion of the verse shows clearly that the quarrel here spoken of relates to differences with them, and in the case of such a difference the only authority is that of God and the Messenger, or the Quran and the Hadith.

Every authority in Islam, whether temporal or spiritual, is included in ulu-l-amr, and independence of thought for every Muslim is thus recognized by allowing them to differ with all except the Quran and the Hadith. The Companions, the Collectors of Hadith, the four Imams and the other jurists being thus included in ulu-l-amr, must be obeyed ordinarily, but to differ with any one or all of them, when one has the authority of the Quran and the Hadith is expressly permitted. And since the ultimate test of the correctness of Hadith is the Quran itself, the conclusion is evident that Islam allows independence of thought subject only to one condition, that the principles laid down in the Quran are not contradicted.

It will thus be seen that any Muslim community has the right to make any law for itself, the only condition being that such law shall not contravene any principle laid down by the Holy Quran. The impression prevailing in the Muslim world at present that no one has the right, even in the light of the new circumstances which a thousand years of the world’s progress have brought about, to differ with the four Imams, is entirely a mistaken one. The right to differ with the highest of men below the Holy Prophet is a Muslim’s birthright, and to take away that right is to stifle the very existence of Islam. Under the present circumstances, when conditions have quite changed and the world has been moving on for a thousand years, while Muslims have more or less stagnated, it is the duty of Muslim states and Muslim peoples to apply their own judgment to the changed conditions, and find out the ways and means for their temporal salvation.

Annotations: (Sadly, due to a lack of Ijtihad, the application of the Islamic way of life has become a challenge in many areas, especially for those living in the West. If only we all heeded the wise words of Maulana Muhammad Ali, who reminded us that the right to differ is a Muslim’s birthright.)

The Doors to Ijtihad are always open:

Excerpt from The Religion of Islam:

The door of Ijtihād is still open

Later jurists regard the door of every degree of Ijtihād to have been closed after the sixth century of Hijrah. It is said that after the immediate disciples of the first four Imams, there can only be followers (muqallidīn). They may only quote a decision (fatwā) from any of the earlier authorities, or when there are differing opinions of the earlier jurisconsults they can choose one of them, but they cannot question the correctness of what has been said. Thus Ijtihād, which was never considered to be an absolute authority by the great Imams or their immediate disciples, is now practically placed on the

same level with the Holy Quran and the Hadith and hence no one now is considered to be fit for Ijtihād.

Annotations: (We should be careful that we do not close the door of ijtihad in our times. Often it seems our exercise of judgment has also stagnated, that the opinions of previous elders are too sacred to critique, hence we have to accept their analysis as if the elders were infallible. Ijtihad is vital for us, since in order to apply Islam to our lives and to believe that Islam is for all times, we must continue to think flexibly and not remain with a fixed mindset in the past.)

It is a mistake to suppose that the door of Ijtihād was closed in any way after the four Imams mentioned above. It is quite clear that the free exercise of judgment was allowed by the Holy Quran, both the Quran and the Hadith explicitly allowed analogical deduction, and it was on the basis of these directions that the Muslim world continued to exercise its judgment in making laws for itself. 

The Companions made use of ijtihad even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime, when it was not convenient to refer a matter to him personally. After his death, as new circumstances arose, new laws were made by the majority of the Caliph’s council and new decisions given by the learned among the Companions. The next generation added to the knowledge of the Companions, and each succeeding generation, not satisfied with what the previous one had achieved, freely applied its judgment. 

The second century saw the four great luminaries appear on the horizon of Ijtihād. The appearance of these great jurists one after another, each evidently dissatisfied with what his predecessor had achieved, is another conclusive argument that Islam permitted human judgment to be exercised freely in order to meet new circumstances.

Ijtihād was a great blessing to the Muslim people; it was the only way through which the needs of succeeding generations and the requirements of different races merging into Islam could be met. Neither the Holy Prophet, nor any of his Companions, nor any of the great jurists ever said that Muslims were forbidden to apply their own judgment to new circumstances and the ever changing needs of a growing community after a certain time. What happened was that the attention of the great intellects of the third century was directed towards the collection and criticism of Hadith. On the other hand, the four Imams rose so high above the ordinary jurists that the latter were dwarfed into insignificance, and the impression gained ground gradually that no one could exercise their judgment independently of the former. This impression in its turn led to limitations upon Ijtihād and the independence of thought to which Islam had given an impetus. Being thus restrained by a false impression, the intellect of Islam suffered a heavy loss and the increasing demand of knowledge being brought to a standstill, stagnation and ignorance took its place.